ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL

MOTION TO DISMISS

RE: United States v. Hannah C. Dugan, Case No. 25-M-397 (SCD)

DATE: April 28, 2025

MOTION TO DISMISS CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

COMES NOW the Defendant, Hannah C. Dugan, by and through undersigned counsel, and respectfully moves this Honorable Court to dismiss the Criminal Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v) for failure to state an offense. This prosecution represents an unprecedented and unconstitutional intrusion into core judicial functions protected by the Constitution's separation of powers doctrine and the inherent authority of judges to control their courtrooms.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents a matter of extraordinary importance to our constitutional structure. The government seeks to criminalize a state judge's exercise of her inherent authority to manage her courtroom—a power that has been recognized since the founding of our republic. By charging Judge Hannah Dugan with obstruction of justice and concealing a person from arrest for actions taken in her official judicial capacity, the prosecution threatens the independence of the judiciary and violates the separation of powers that is fundamental to our constitutional system.

The facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, describe nothing more than a judge exercising her legitimate authority to manage her courtroom, control the movement of individuals within it, and maintain the dignity and security of judicial proceedings. This Court should dismiss these charges as a matter of law, as they criminalize conduct that is protected by the Constitution and fall outside the scope of the criminal statutes invoked by the prosecution.

ARGUMENT

I. THE PROSECUTION VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE

A. Judicial Independence Is Fundamental to Our Constitutional Structure

The independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our constitutional democracy. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, "the separation of powers, a distinctively American political doctrine, profits from the advice authored by Montesquieu that legislative and executive powers be separated and distinct from the judiciary's domain." Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011). The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the critical importance of "jealously guard[ing]" the independence of the judiciary against encroachment from the other branches. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982).

This independence is not merely a matter of constitutional structure—it is essential to the functioning of our justice system. "Judges must be free to make decisions free from external pressures or influence." Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009). This prosecution, brought by the Executive Branch against a state judge for decisions made in her judicial capacity, strikes at the heart of this independence.

B. Criminal Prosecution of Judicial Actions Is an Unconstitutional Intrusion

The decision to criminally prosecute a judge for actions taken in her judicial capacity represents an extraordinary and unconstitutional intrusion by the Executive Branch into the Judicial Branch. As this Court recognized in United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1984), "if there is a fear of criminal penalties, the judicial mind might unconsciously favor the interest that carried the threat of prosecution."

This is not to suggest that judges are above the law. However, there are established mechanisms for addressing judicial misconduct—including judicial discipline proceedings, appellate review, and civil remedies—that do not threaten the independence of the judiciary as criminal prosecution does. The Executive Branch's decision to bypass these mechanisms in favor of a criminal prosecution represents an unconstitutional overreach that this Court should reject.

C. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine Prohibits Federal Conscription of State Judges

The prosecution's theory essentially seeks to convert Judge Dugan into an agent of federal immigration enforcement. This directly contravenes the anti-commandeering doctrine established in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and reaffirmed in Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018), which prohibits the federal government from "commandeering" state officials to administer federal programs.

As the Supreme Court held in Printz, "the Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers... to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." 521 U.S. at 935. This principle applies with even greater force to state judges, whose independence is essential to our federal system.

The government's prosecution theory would effectively criminalize Judge Dugan's refusal to assist ICE in executing an administrative warrant. This violates the core principle that "the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." Id. at 933. Judge Dugan had no constitutional obligation to assist in federal immigration enforcement, and her decision not to do so cannot form the basis for criminal liability.

II. JUDGES POSSESS INHERENT AUTHORITY TO CONTROL THEIR COURTROOMS

A. The Well-Established Inherent Powers of the Judiciary

It is a fundamental principle of American jurisprudence that courts possess inherent powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)). These inherent powers include the authority to "manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that these inherent powers include the authority to control courtroom proceedings and the movement of individuals within the courtroom. In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970), the Court emphasized that "courts must have sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case." This discretion necessarily includes the authority to direct the movement of individuals within the courtroom and to adjacent areas for security and logistical purposes.

Judge Dugan's actions—directing an individual to exit through a side door commonly used for security purposes—fall squarely within this well-established inherent authority. Criminalizing such actions would fundamentally undermine judicial independence and the effective administration of justice.

B. The Essential Authority to Maintain Courtroom Security and Decorum

The inherent power to control the courtroom includes the authority to maintain security and decorum. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "A courtroom maintains its dignity by the conduct of trial participants." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). Judges must be free to make decisions to maintain this dignity without fear of criminal prosecution.

The criminal complaint acknowledges that Judge Dugan was conducting proceedings when informed of ICE agents' presence and that victims in Flores-Ruiz's case were present in the courtroom. In such circumstances, a judge's decision to direct an individual to exit through a side door—rather than through the public gallery where a potentially disruptive arrest might take place—represents a legitimate exercise of judicial authority to maintain courtroom security and decorum.

Prior courthouse arrests by ICE had caused disruption and were the subject of ongoing policy discussions within the courthouse, as evidenced by the Chief Judge's statement that he was "working on a policy which would dictate locations within the courthouse where ICE could safely conduct enforcement actions." Criminal Complaint ¶ 27. Judge Dugan's actions must be understood in this context, as a reasonable exercise of her authority to maintain court security pending the development of a comprehensive policy.

C. Administrative Warrants Do Not Override Judicial Authority

ICE agents possessed only an administrative warrant, not a judicial warrant. This distinction is legally significant. Administrative warrants do not carry the same authority as judicial warrants and do not override a judge's inherent authority to control her courtroom.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, administrative warrants are limited in scope and do not authorize intrusion into non-public areas or interference with judicial proceedings. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (discussing limitations of administrative warrants). Judge Dugan's actions can be understood as enforcing these limitations, ensuring that ICE agents did not exceed the scope of their administrative warrant by disrupting judicial proceedings.

Moreover, administrative warrants impose no legal obligation on state judges to assist federal immigration enforcement. As discussed above, any such obligation would violate the anti-commandeering doctrine. Judge Dugan's decision to direct Flores-Ruiz out through a side door rather than facilitate his immediate arrest in her courtroom was a legitimate exercise of her judicial discretion.

III. THE CRIMINAL STATUTES DO NOT REACH LEGITIMATE JUDICIAL ACTIONS

A. Constitutional Avoidance Requires Narrow Construction of Criminal Statutes

The canon of constitutional avoidance requires that statutes be construed to avoid serious constitutional questions. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Interpreting federal criminal statutes to reach a judge's courtroom management decisions would raise serious constitutional questions regarding separation of powers and judicial independence.

To avoid these constitutional concerns, this Court should construe 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 1071 as not reaching legitimate judicial actions taken in the management of court proceedings. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, "if an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is 'fairly possible,' we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems." INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).

B. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 Cannot Reach Legitimate Judicial Functions

Section 1505 prohibits corruptly influencing, obstructing, or impeding a proceeding before a department or agency of the United States. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the term "corruptly" requires "an intent to procure an unlawful benefit either for oneself or for another." Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005). A judge's good-faith exercise of her inherent authority to manage courtroom proceedings cannot satisfy this element.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized that obstruction statutes require a "nexus" between the alleged obstructive conduct and the proceeding at issue. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). Actions taken by a judge to manage her own courtroom and proceedings lack this nexus to a separate federal agency proceeding.

To construe § 1505 as reaching a judge's courtroom management decisions would create serious constitutional concerns and potentially criminalize a wide range of legitimate judicial actions. This Court should reject such an interpretation.

C. 18 U.S.C. § 1071 Cannot Criminalize Judicial Logistical Decisions

Section 1071 prohibits harboring or concealing a person to prevent his discovery and arrest. The Supreme Court has emphasized that criminal statutes must be construed strictly, with any ambiguity resolved in favor of lenity. United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994). Directing an individual to exit a courtroom through a side door commonly used for security and logistical purposes—where the individual immediately enters a public area—cannot constitute "concealment" under any reasonable interpretation of this term.

Moreover, interpreting § 1071 to reach a judge's decision about the movement of individuals within her courtroom would raise serious constitutional concerns regarding judicial independence and the separation of powers. Under the avoidance canon, this Court should reject such an interpretation.

D. This Case Presents a Non-Justiciable Political Question

The prosecution of Judge Dugan for her judicial actions presents a political question that is not appropriate for resolution by this Court. Under the political question doctrine, certain matters are committed to the political branches and are not subject to judicial review. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

The relationship between state courts and federal immigration enforcement involves delicate questions of federalism and the separation of powers that are more appropriately addressed through policy discussions and political processes than through criminal prosecution. The Chief Judge's statement that he was "working on a policy" regarding ICE enforcement in the courthouse underscores this point. Criminal Complaint ¶ 27.

By attempting to criminalize Judge Dugan's actions, the prosecution is effectively asking this Court to make policy judgments about the proper balance between state judicial authority and federal immigration enforcement. Such judgments are better left to the political branches.

CONCLUSION

The prosecution of Judge Hannah Dugan for actions taken in her judicial capacity strikes at the heart of judicial independence and violates the separation of powers that is fundamental to our constitutional system. The charges seek to criminalize the legitimate exercise of judicial authority to control courtroom proceedings and maintain court security. Moreover, they attempt to conscript state judges into federal immigration enforcement in violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine.

The criminal statutes invoked by the prosecution cannot reasonably be construed to reach legitimate judicial actions without raising serious constitutional concerns. Under the constitutional avoidance canon, this Court should reject such an interpretation and dismiss the charges.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss the Criminal Complaint in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

Defense Counsel

PROPOSED ORDER

Having considered Defendant Hannah C. Dugan's Motion to Dismiss and the government's response, and for the reasons set forth in the Defendant's motion, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES the Criminal Complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.